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1 Introduction
In the theory of endogenous time preference, one of the most common and,
at the same time, the most controversial assumptions is that the degree of
impatience, measured by the rate of time preference, is increasing in wealth.
Although there is no empirical evidence to the assumption of increasing im-
patience,1 no research has so far been conducted on theoretical or economic
implications of decreasing impatience, notwithstanding the huge accumula-
tion of research on time preference and/or recursive preferences. Why is the
assumption of decreasing impatience theoretically problematic? Whether or
not can we consider well-behaved models of decreasing impatience that are
immune to the “theoretical problem”? And if such models are available,
what would be economic implications of decreasing impatience? All of these
problems are left unsolved. For example, it has often been stressed that the
assumption of increasing impatience is required to ease dynamic analyses by
ensuring stability (see, e.g., Epstein (1987a,b), Lucas and Stokey (1984), and
Obstfeld (1990)). However, Svensson and Razin (1983) criticized this rea-
soning since unstable equilibrium time paths of the economy cannot be ruled
out a priori. We should consider what would be problematic when deceasing
impatience destabilizes dynamics.
This paper tackles these problems regarding decreasing impatience. The
main aims are: (i) to clarify its theoretical di¢culty; and (ii) to examine
economic implications of decreasing impatience by considering well-behaved
models. We …rst show that instability resulting from decreasing impatience
is inconsistent with optimality in a certain situation. In particular, with
appropriate regularity conditions such as concavity, divergent consumption
paths under decreasing impatience are shown to make, sooner or later, the
discount rate negative, thereby violating the transversality condition for the
discount factor when the rate of interest is constant.
This di¢culty does not occur in two cases: (a) when there exists some
decreasing-return properties that stabilize economic dynamics; and/or (b)
when there are upper bounds for consumption resources. As a typical ex-
ample of case (a), we incorporate capital accumulation with the neoclassical
production function. The resultant well-behaved decreasing-impatience mod-
1See Lawrance (1991), Becker and Mulligan (1997), and Samwick (1997). They com-
monly reported that the degree of impatience is decreasing in wealth or income. See
also Ogawa (1993), which reported that the shapes of the time preference schedule are
internationally di¤erent.
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els are used to elucidate implications of decreasing impatience for two policy
issues which has been discussed in the literature of increasing impatience
(e.g., Epstein and Hynes (1983) and Obstfeld (1990)): (i) the e¤ects of cap-
ital taxation; and (ii) the e¤ects of in‡ation on economic growth. As for
(b), we consider a two-country model, in which consumption resources are
bounded by a constant world output level. By using the model, we examine
(iii) wealth distribution dynamics in a two-country world economy.
Main implications we show on issues (i) though (iii) are as follows. In the
neoclassical model with decreasing impatience, an increase in capital taxes
raises the long-run interest rate, so that the long-run tax incidence on capi-
tal are larger than in the cases of constant time preference and of increasing
impatience. When impatience is decreasing, a decrease in the capital stock
caused by capital taxation makes consumers less patient, which raises the
long-run interest rate irrespective of the capital tax increase, and thereby
causes a further reduction in the capital stock. This property is contrasted
sharply to what is obtained in the literature by assuming increasing impa-
tience (e.g., Epstein and Hynes (1983)).
When money is introduced into the neoclassical model with decreasing
impatience, an increase in the rate of nominal money growth reduces the
steady state capital stock, that is the Tobin e¤ect does not hold. This im-
plication, which again contrasts to the case of increasing impatience (e.g.,
Epstein and Hynes (1983)), is consistent with many empirical studies report-
ing of growth-harming in‡ation (e.g., Barro (1995) and Bruno and Easterly
(1998)).
In the two-country context, decreasing impatience leads to various wealth-
distribution dynamics. If impatience is decreasing in both of the two coun-
tries, the equilibrium time path of the world economy is unstable. When one
country displays decreasing impatience while the other displays increasing
impatience, the equilibrium time path can be either stable or unstable, de-
pending on the relative degrees of the increasingness and decreasingness of
impatience. In the stable case, an upward shift of the subjective discount rate
schedule in the country with increasing impatience lowers the steady-state
interest rate. With decreasing impatience, there can be multiple steady-state
equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an in-
tertemporal utility maximization problem with decreasing impatience and
points out the di¢culty of decreasing impatience. In Section 3, the e¤ects of
capital taxation are examined. In Section 4, the e¤ects on capital accumula-
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tion of monetary growth are examined. In Section 5, wealth distribution in
a two-country economy is investigated. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Di¢culty under decreasing impatience
2.1 Regular utility maximization problems
To clarify theoretical di¢culties of decreasing impatience, begin with check-
ing a necessary and su¢cient condition for optimal consumption in the
standard model of endogenous time preference. Consider an in…nitely-lived
consumer who maximizes lifetime utility by choosing the time pro…le of n-
commodity consumptions fc (t)g1t=0 = f(c1 (t) ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; cn (t))g1t=0 and total asset
holding fa (t)g1t=0. His or her problem is speci…ed as problem (P) in the
following:
(P) max
Z 1
0
u (c (t)) exp(¡¢(t))dt; (1)
subject to:
_a (t) = h(a (t) ; c (t)); a (0) = a0 (constant); a (t) ¸ 0;
_¢ (t) = ± (c (t)) ;¢(0) = 0;
where a dot represents the time derivative; u (c) represents the felicity func-
tion; ¢ denotes a cumulative discount rate with the instantaneous discount
rate being given by ± (c): ¢(t) =
R t
0 ± (c (¿))d¿ ; and h(a; c) is the law of
motion for a, which is assumed to be concave in (a; c).2
The regularity conditions to make problem (P) well-de…ned should be
treated carefully since decreasing impatience may be inconsistent with those
conditions. With the present-value Hamiltonian function de…ned by
H = u(c) exp(¡¢) + ¸ph(a; c) + ´p± (c) ;
where ¸p and ´p represent the present-value shadow prices of _a and _¢, re-
spectively,3 we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that intertemporal utility maximization problem (P)
satis…es:
2Asset holding a includes both …nancial wealth and human capital. We can rewrite the
positivity condition for a as the no-Ponzi game condition to bond holdings.
3We abbreviate the notation of time when there is no risk of confusion.
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1. u < 0 ;
2. u is concave;
3. ¡u is log-convex; and
4. ± is concave,
then, the …rst-order condition:
@H
@c
= 0;
@H
@a
= ¡ _¸ p; @H
@¢
= ¡ _´ p;
and the transversality conditions:
lim
t!1 a (t)¸
p (t) = 0; lim
t!1 ¢(t) ´
p (t) = 0;
are also su¢cient for the optimal consumption plan.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1: Under the conditions given in Proposition 1, the solution to
problem (P) may not be unique. The uniqueness of the solution is ensured
if conditions 2 through 4 are rewritten by using the “strict” versions of con-
cavity and convexity.
The degree of impatience is increasing or decreasing in wealth as ± is
increasing or decreasing in consumption. In what follows, impatience is said
to marginally increasing (decreasing), or simply increasing (decreasing), when
± is increasing (decreasing) in c:
Throughout the paper, we assume that regularity conditions 1 through 4
in Proposition 1 are satis…ed. Note, however, that these conditions are not
related to whether the subjective discount rate ± is increasing or decreasing.
What is required to the discount function ± is just concavity: it can be (i)
monotonically increasing; (ii) monotonically decreasing; or (iii) hump-shaped
as illustrated in Figure 1, where the one-commodity case is depicted. Several
researchers (e.g., Fukao and Hamada (1991) and Jafarey and Park (1998))
consider U-shaped nonmonotonic discount-rate functions. Proposition 1 im-
plies that with their discount-rate functions the usual …rst-order conditions
do not ensure optima.
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2.2 Di¢culties of decreasing impatience
With only few exceptions, it has been assumed that impatience is increasing
in the literature. One main reason is that decreasing impatience is likely
to destabilize dynamics. Svensson and Razin (1983) criticize this treatment,
pointing out that stability cannot be regarded a priori as more reasonable
than instability. As a result of the instability, however, there may be no
optimal solution when decreasing impatience, as we shall show now.
Under the regularity conditions given in Proposition 1, consider consumer
problem (P) with one-commodity by assuming:
² (A1) impatience is decreasing: ±c (c) < 0; and
² (A2) the rate of interest r is constant,
where ±c (c) represents d± (c) =dc.
Let his or her ‡ow budget constraint be given by
_a = ra¡ c: (2)
When we de…ne the generating function g as
g (c; Á) = u (c)¡ Á± (c) ;
where Á (t) represents the lifetime utility U (t) from the consumption stream
after time t, g generates Á by the low of motion,
_Á = ¡g (c; Á) s.t. lim
t!1Á (t) exp (¡¢(t)) = 0:
We assume that gc > 0 and gcc < 0.
Let ¸ represent the current-value shadow price for savings. With the
lifetime utility function (1), the optimal conditions are given by4
gc (c; Á) = ¸; (3)
_¸ = (± (c)¡ r)¸; (4)
4Letting ­ denote the discount facor ­ ´ exp (¡¢), the current-value shadow price
¸ can be related to ¸p in Proposition 1 as ¸ = ¸p=­. The Á is the shadow price or the
costate variable for the evolution of the discount facor ­ : _­ = ¡±­: It can be related to
the present-value costate variable ´p in Proposition 1 as ´p = ¡Á­.
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_Á = ¡g (c; Á) ; (5)
lim
t!1 exp (¡¢(t))¸ (t) a (t) = 0; (6)
lim
t!1 exp (¡¢(t))Á (t) = 0: (7)
De…ne the rate of time preference ½ as ½ = ¡d ln­ (t) =dtj _c=0 ; where ­ ´
gc (c; Á) exp (¡¢) represents the present-value marginal utility of c. Then,
from equation (3), equation (4) can be rewritten as
_c = ¡ gc (c; Á)
gcc (c; Á)
(r ¡ ½ (c; Á)) ; (8)
where
½ (c; Á) = ± (c)¡ g (c; Á)
gc (c; Á)
±c (c) : (9)
The optimal path for (c; Á; a) must be jointly generated by equations (2),
(5), and (8). In particular, local dynamics around steady state should be
determined from:0B@ _c_Á
_a
1CA =
0B@ 0
r±c
gcc
0
¡gc r 0
¡1 0 r
1CA
0B@ c^Á^
a^
1CA ;
where the coe¢cient matrix is evaluated at the steady state; and a hat x^
denotes a deviation from the steady state value: x^ = x¡x¤: The characteristic
roots for this system are:
r > 0; !0 ´ (1=2)
8<:r +
Ã
r2 ¡ 4r±c
gccgc
!1=29=; > 0; and (10)
! ´ (1=2)
8<:r ¡
Ã
r2 ¡ 4r±c
gccgc
!1=29=; > 0:
Note that any time paths governed by the roots other than ! cannot
satisfy the transversality condition (6). The optimal solution, if it exists, is
thus given by the eigenvector associated with smallest root !. As seen from
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(10), decreasing impatience implies a positive !:5 the resultant saddle path
governed by ! is unstable, which is consistent with what has been pointed
out in the literature. Given the concavity of ±, this unstable saddle path
cannot satisfy the TVC (7) if the initial wealth holding a0 is larger than the
steady state stock ¹a, as we shall demonstrate just below.
Let c0 be any consumption level such that ± (c0) > 0: Due to concavity, ±
satis…es that for c > c0 ¡ ±(c0)
±c(c0) ;
± (c) < ± (c0) + ±c (c0) (c¡ c0)
< 0;
implying that ± is negative for the consumption levels which are higher than a
…nite critical value (see Figure 1). Suppose that a (0) is larger than a¤. Then,
if consumption evolves along the saddle trajectory governed by !, c grows
at that rate for ever. After some point in time, ± continues to take negative
values. This consumption time-pro…le de…nitely violates the transversality
condition (7):
Proposition 2 (di¢culty of decreasing impatience): Under (A1) and (A2),
problem (P) has no optimal solution if a (0) > a¤.
Remark 2: As an important corollary, decreasing impatience is not suit-
able for analyzing small country models since, in the constant interest-rate
economy, decreasing impatience may prevent us from having optimal solu-
tion. Intuitively, when consumption divergently grows, the subjective dis-
count rate falls into the negative region, so that the transversality condition
(7) is violated.
Remark 2 has an important implication for what Svensson and Razin
(1983) discussed. They criticize Obstfeld’s result that the Harberger-Laursen-
Metzler (HLM) e¤ect cannot occur by claiming that it depends crucially on
the assumption of increasing impatience and showing that with decreasing
impatience the HLM e¤ect de…nitely takes place. However, their analysis is
limited to a small country model, in which the assumption of decreasing im-
patience is inconsistent with the existence of the optimal solution, as shown
by Remark 2.
Proposition 2 does not imply that we cannot analyze decreasing impa-
tience models in any situations. There are two cases in which we can treat
5Root ! can be imaginary. In that case, the real part of ! is positive.
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well-behaved models with decreasing impatience: that is, (i) when the models
are stabilized by some other decreasing properties in production technology
and/or preferences, for which case unstable time paths are excluded; and
(ii) when there is some upper bound for consumption resources, which en-
ables even divergent time paths to satisfy the transversality conditions. As
a typical example of (i), we incorporate capital accumulation with a usual
decreasing-return technology in Sections 3 and 4. The resultant well-behaved
models are used to analyze the implications of decreasing impatience for the
e¤ects of capital taxation and in‡ation. As for (ii), Section 5 considers a two-
country model, in which consumption resources are bounded by a constant
world output level.
3 The e¤ects of capital taxation
Let us examine the implication of decreasing impatience for the e¤ect of
capital taxation. Epstein and Hynes (1983) showed that with endogenous
time preference capital taxes reduce the steady state capital stock less than
under constant time preference. However this result depends crucially on the
assumption of increasing impatience. When impatience is decreasing, the
result is drastically changed, as we shall show below.
Consider the usual neoclassical model: there are two production factors,
labor and capital; there is a single multi-purpose commodity; it is produced
by using a constant-to-scale technology F ; and …rms are competitive. Con-
sumers supply one unit of labor at each instant inelastically. Their prefer-
ences are speci…ed just as in the previous section. In particular, we assume
decreasing impatience, ±c (c) < 0. The government levies tax ¿ on capital
income and pays back the revenue to consumers in the lump-sum manner.
Letting k represent the capital labor ratio and f a percapita production func-
tion satisfying fk > 0 and fkk < 0, we can easily obtain a reduced dynamic
system as follows:
_c = ¡ gc (c; Á)
gcc (c; Á)
((1¡ ¿ ) fk (k)¡ ½ (c; Á)) ;
_Á = ¡g (c; Á) ; (11)
_k = f (k)¡ c;
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where the steady state equilibrium (c¤; k¤) is jointly determined by:
± (c¤) = (1¡ ¿ ) fk (k¤) ; (12)
f (k¤) = c¤: (13)
Assuming the existence of a steady state equilibrium, consider the local
dynamics around the steady state. Then, we can prove the following saddle-
point stability condition:
Property 1: The equilibrium time path is uniquely given by the stable arm
if and only if:
±c (c
¤) fk (k¤) > (1¡ ¿) fkk (k¤) :
Proof. See Appendix B.
Assumption 1: ±c (c) fk (k) > (1¡ ¿) fkk (k) :
Remark 3: As shown in Appendix B, if Assumption 1 were not met, the
three characteristic roots would be all positive, so that the di¢culty shown
by Proposition 2 would occur, insofar as the distortion ¿ is su¢ciently small
(close to zero) or su¢ciently large (close to one).6
With Assumption 1, we can illustrate the determination of the steady
state capital stock k¤ and the e¤ect of capital taxation on it by using Figure
2. From (12) and (13), k¤ is determined by
± (f (k¤)) = (1¡ ¿ ) fk (k¤) :
As shown in Figure 2, (1¡ ¿ ) fk (k¤) can be depicted as a downward-sloping
schedule in the (r; k) plane. With decreasing impatience, ± (f (k¤)) can also
be expressed by a downward-sloping schedule, where, from Assumption 1, the
(1¡ ¿ ) fk (k¤) schedule is steeper than the ± (f (k¤)) schedule. The steady-
state capital stock k¤ is given at the intersection, say point E0; of the two
schedules.
6When the distortion is neither su¢ciently small nor su¢ciently large, however, we
cannot rule out a priori the (very little) possibility that without Assumption 1 two of
the three characteristic roots are negative. In that case, there exist multiple equilibria:
we have to be confronted with the indeterminacy problem, instead of the no-existence
problem.
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Now suppose that capital tax ¿ is raised from ¿0 to ¿1: It shifts the
(1¡ ¿ ) fk (k¤) schedule downward, thereby bringing the steady state point
from point E0 to E1. Consequently, k¤ decreases in response to the tax in-
crease. Note that this reduction in k¤ and hence the long-run tax incidence
on capital are larger than in the case of constant time preference: if ± were
constant, the reduction would stop at k0: This property is contrasted sharply
to what Epstein and Hynes (1983) stressed by assuming increasing impa-
tience. When impatience is decreasing, a decrease in k¤ makes consumers
impatience, which raises the long-run interest rate irrespective of the capital
tax increase, and thereby causes a further reduction in k¤.
Implication 1: When impatience is decreasing, an increase in capital taxes
raises the long-run interest rate, so that the long-run tax incidence on capi-
tal is larger than in the cases of constant time preference and of increasing
impatience.
4 In‡ation and growth with decreasing impatience
Many empirical studies have reported that in‡ation harms capital accumu-
lation (e.g., Fischer (1993), De Gregorio (1992, 1993), Barro (1995), and
Bruno and Easterly (1998)), whereas theoretical models including Epstein
and Hynes (1983) often predict the Tobin e¤ect that in‡ation promotes
growth by shifting real money balances away in favor of consumption. As the
second implication of decreasing impatience, we shall show that an increase
in the rate of nominal money growth reduces the steady state capital stock.
Let us extend the model in section 3 by introducing money in the “money-
in-the-utility-function” framework. For brevity we specify the subjective dis-
count rate as a function of the felicity level, ± = ± (u) as in Uzawa (1968),
where decreasing impatience is assumed by setting ±0 (u) < 0. The consumer’s
problem is now given by
max
Z 1
0
u (c;m) exp(¡¢)dt; (14)
subject to:
_¢ = ± (u (c;m)) ; (15)
_a = ra+ w ¡ c¡ (r + ¼)m+ x; (16)
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a = k +m; (17)
where a represents total …nancial wealth; m real money holdings; w the wage
rate; ¼ the rate of in‡ation; and x the lump-sum transfer payments from the
government.
Assume that the regularity condition given in Proposition 1 is satis…ed.
Letting g (c;m; Á) be u (c;m)¡ Á± (u (c;m)), the optimal consumption plan
should satisfy:
gc (c;m; Á) = ¸;
Â(c;m) ´ um (c;m)
uc (c;m)
= r + ¼; (18)
_¸ = (± (u (c;m))¡ r)¸;
_Á = ¡g (c;m; Á) ;
and the transversality conditions. In the same way to obtain (8), the …rst-
order conditions can be reduced to:
_c
c
= ¡ gc (c;m; Á)
cgcc (c;m; Á)
(r ¡ ½ (c;m; Á)) ;
_m
m
= ¡ gm (c;m; Á)
mgmm (c;m; Á)
(r ¡ ½(c;m; Á)); (19)
where ½ (c;m; Á) is de…ned using g (c;m; Á) as in (9). We assume that gc > 0;
gm > 0; gcc < 0; gmm < 0; and gcm = 0.
Money is supplied by the government in the form of “helicopter money:”
¹m = x; (20)
where ¹ denotes the growth rate of nominal money supply.
From the pro…t-maximizing behavior of …rms, r and w are given as
w = f (k)¡ kfk (k) ; r = fk (k) : (21)
Substituting (17), (20), and (21) into (16) yields
_k = f (k)¡ c:
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By combining _m
m
= ¹¡ ¼ with (18) and (19), we obtain
gm
mgmm
(½(c;m; Á)¡ fk(k)) = ¹+ fk(k)¡ Â(c;m);
which can be solved for m as
m = À(c; Á; k;¹):
By using this, the dynamic system is …nally reduced to:
_c = ¡ gc (c; À(c; Á; k;¹); Á)
gcc (c; À(c; Á; k;¹); Á)
(fk(k)¡ ½ (c; À(c; Á; k; ¹); Á)) ;
_Á = ¡g (c; À(c; Á; k;¹); Á) ;
_k = f (k)¡ c:
The steady state equilibrium (c¤;m¤; k¤) is determined by
± (u (c¤;m¤)) = fk(k¤);
Â(c¤;m¤) = fk(k¤) + ¹; (22)
f (k¤) = c¤:
By analyzing the local dynamics around the steady state, we can show the
following:
Property 2: The equilibrium time path is saddle-point stable only if
¤ ´ (1¡ ÂÂc
Âm
)±uucfk ¡ fkk + Â
Âm
±uucfkk > 0:
Proof. See Appendix C.
Assumption 2: ¤ > 0:
Remark 4: Assumption 2 is a necessary condition for the system to be
saddle-point stable, under which the determinant of the coe¢cient matrix is
negative. As shown in Appendix C, the trace of the matrix, 2r + gmr±uum
mgmmÂm
;
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should be positive for the saddle-point stability. Otherwise all of the three
roots might be negative, implying that there might be multiple equilibria.
Let us now examine the e¤ect of a permanent increase in the core rate of
in‡ation ¹. From (22), the steady state equilibrium is determined by
± (u (f (k¤) ;m¤)) = fk(k¤); (23)
Â(f (k¤) ;m¤) = fk(k¤) + ¹: (24)
Figure 3 depicts the determination, where schedule KK 0 represents (23)
and MM 0 (24). The MM 0 schedule is positively sloping and, under As-
sumption 2, the slope of the KK 0 schedule is also positive and gentler than
that of MM 0. The steady state is determined at the intersection of the two
schedules. An increase in ¹ shifts the MM 0 schedule upward, bringing the
steady state point from E0 to E1. As illustrated, the steady state capital
stock decreases in response to the rise in the in‡ation rate. In fact, from (23)
and (24), we can derive
dk¤
d¹
= ¡±uum
Âm¤
< 0: (25)
This result can be summarized as follows:
Implication 2: When impatience is decreasing, an increase in the core rate
of in‡ation harms capital accumulation, that is the Tobin e¤ect does not take
place.
Remark 5: As seen from (25), whether an increase in ¹ increases or decreases
k¤ depends crucially on the sign of @±=@m, but not on @±=@c, that is on
whether impatience with respect to m is increasing or decreasing, but not
on whether impatience with respect to c is increasing or decreasing. When ±
depends on (c;m) independently of u, and hence when preferences are weakly
non-separable in the sense of Shi (1994), the same result as in implication 2
is valid even if impatience is increasing in c.
5 Wealth distribution dynamics in a two-country world
economy
Let us …nally consider the implication of decreasing impatience in a two-
country model. Suppose that the world economy is composed of countries
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1 and 2, each of which is populated with in…nitely-lived identical agents.
The representative agent in each country consumes a single consumption
good and holds wealth in the form of bonds. Both the goods and bonds are
traded freely in international markets. For brevity, the representative agents
in country i (i = 1; 2) are assumed to be endowed with constant amounts yi.
The budget constraint for the representative agent is given by
_bi = rbi + yi ¡ ci; (26)
where bi represents net foreign assets held by country i.
By assuming the same preference structure as speci…ed in section 2.2, the
optimal conditions can be obtained in exactly the same way as in (3) through
(7). They reduce to, for i = 1; 2;
_ci = ¾i
n
r ¡ ½i(ci; Ái)
o
; (27)
_Á
i
= ±i
³
ci
´
Ái ¡ ui
³
ci
´
;
and the transversality conditions, where ¾i = ¡gic=gicc:
The market-clearing conditions are given by
c1 (t) + c2 (t) = Y; (28)
b1 (t) + b2 (t) = 0;
where Y represents the aggregate output, y1 + y2: The interest rate is en-
dogenously determined by the market clearing condition: by di¤erentiating
(28) and substituting (27) into the result, we can obtain
r =
¾1
¾1 + ¾2
½1(c1; Á1) +
¾2
¾1 + ¾2
½2(c2; Á2); (29)
implying that the equilibrium interest rate is determined as a weighted sum
of the rates of time preference in the two countries.
From (28) and (29), the dynamic system (26) through (27) can be reduced
to:
_c1 =
¾1¾2
¾1 + ¾2
n
½2(Y ¡ c1; Á2)¡ ½1(c1; Á1)
o
;
_Á
1
= ±1
³
c1
´
Á1 ¡ u1
³
c1
´
;
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_Á
2
= ±2
³
Y ¡ c1
´
Á2 ¡ u2
³
Y ¡ c1
´
;
_b1 =
(
¾1
¾1 + ¾2
½1(c1; Á1) +
¾2
¾1 + ¾2
½2(Y ¡ c1; Á2)
)
b1 + y1 ¡ c1;
the steady state of which is determined by
±1
³
c1¤
´
= ±2
³
Y ¡ c1¤
´
= r¤;
Á1¤ = u1
³
c1¤
´
=r¤; Á2¤ = u2
³
Y ¡ c1¤
´
=r¤;
c1¤ = r¤b1¤ + y1; c2¤ = r¤b2¤ + y2:
By analyzing the local dynamics around the steady state, we can obtain the
following property:
Property 3: The steady-state point is locally saddle-point stable if and only
if
±1c
³
c1¤
´
+ ±2c
³
Y ¡ c1¤
´
> 0: (30)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Remark 6: Unlike in the previous sections, stability (in the saddle-point
sense) is not necessary for an equilibrium path to exist. Even if (30) is not
satis…ed and hence even if the steady state is unstable, the time-path that
governed by the smallest root can be an equilibrium. In the previous sections,
consumption is not bounded from the above, so that any divergent consump-
tion paths, sooner or later, make the discount rate negative and thereby
violate the transversality condition. In the present two country setting, in
contrast, consumption is bounded by the total quantity Y of world output,
which allows a divergent equilibrium consumption time-path. In particular,
this is the case when min (±1 (Y ) ; ±2 (Y )) > 0, for which case the discount
rates remain positive for any divergent time-paths of the economy.
As implied by Property 3, if impatience is decreasing in both of the two
countries, the equilibrium time path is unstable. For a steady-state equilib-
rium to be saddle-point stable, at least one of the two countries should display
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increasing impatience.7 Suppose that one of the two, say country 2, exhibits
increasing impatience, whereas the other’s, i.e., country 1’s impatience is de-
creasing. For a steady-state equilibrium allocation to be saddle-point stable,
a marginal transfer from country 1 to country 2 should make the recipient
country 2 less patient.8 Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the determination of
the steady-state equilibrium and equilibrium dynamics in the (c1; r)-plane in
the stable and unstable cases, respectively. The ±1 and ±2 are both depicted
as decreasing functions in c1. The steady-state equilibrium is determined at
the intersection E of the two schedules. As is shown, steady state is stable
if and only if the ±1-schedule cuts the ±2-schedule from the below.9
Using Figure 4(a), consider the e¤ect of an upward shift of country 2’s
subjective discount rate schedule ±2. This brings the steady state point from
E to E0, lowering the steady state interest rate. The upward shift in ±2;
ceteris paribus, makes country 2 less patience than country 1, which induces
wealth movements from country 2 to 1 and thereby reduces the interest rate
along the ±1-schedule.
Implication 3: Suppose that a country exhibits decreasing impatience whereas
the other displays increasing impatience, and that saddle-point stability con-
dition (30) is met. Then, an upward shift of the subjective discount rate
schedule in the country with increasing impatience lowers the steady-state
interest rate.
With decreasing impatience, there can be multiple steady-state equilib-
ria. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate typical possibilities. First, consider the
case as illustrated in Figure 5(a). Only when the initial wealth distribu-
tion is su¢ciently equal, the economy will converge to the steady state point
7For the analysis of the two-country world economy with increasing impatience, see
Devereux and Shi (1991).
8The same condition is derived by Jafarey and Park (1998).
9In Figure 4 (b), the divergent time paths towards (c1; c2) = (Y; 0) and (0; Y ) are
equilibria, if
lim
ci!0
gic
¡
ci; ui
¡
ci
¢
=±i
¡
ci
¢¢
gicc (c
i; ui (ci) =±i (ci))
= 0; i = 1; 2;
for which case points (Y; 0) and (0; Y ) are steady state equibria that are saddle-point stable.
It can be shown that a su¢cient condition for the above equation to be vaild is: (i) ±i is a
function of ui; (ii) ui displays constant relative risk aversion; and (iii) Á±uu= (1¡ Á±u) is
bounded.
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S with both countries consuming positive quantities of goods. If the ini-
tial wealth is distributed quite unequally, the economy will asymptotically
converge to the steady state point (c1; c2) = (Y; 0) or (0; Y ), at which only ini-
tially wealthy country has positive consumption. In this sense, co-prosperity
needs su¢ciently equal initial wealth distribution. Figure 5(b) illustrates an-
other multiple-equilibrium case, where there is unstable steady state point U
with fairly equal wealth distribution, placed between two equilibria S1 and
S2 with uneven distributions. In this case, unequal wealth distributions are
both stable and long-run wealth distribution is likely to be uneven. There
is a threshold level for initial wealth holding that determines which unequal
distribution of S1 and S2 takes place.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined theoretical as well as policy implications of decreas-
ing impatience. We have …rst shown that in constant interest-rate economies
divergent consumption time-paths resulting from decreasing impatience are
often inconsistent with optimality. This di¢culty disappears (i) when there
are some deceasing-return properties built in the model; and/or (ii) when
there is some upper bound for consumption resources. Based on this obser-
vation, we have considered well-behaved decreasing-impatience models and
investigated their policy implications.
In the neoclassical model with decreasing impatience, an increase in cap-
ital taxes raises the long-run interest rate and the long-run tax incidence on
capital are larger than in the case of constant time preference and of increas-
ing impatience. When money is introduced into this model, the Tobin e¤ect
does not hold and in‡ation harms capital accumulation, as many empirical
studies have reported. In the two-country context, decreasing impatience
leads to various interesting multiple steady-state equilibria. We have shown
the existence of an equilibrium in which an upward shift of a country’s dis-
count rate function lowers the world interest rate.
On Decreasing Impatience 18
A Proof of Proposition 1:
Let us de…ne q(c;¢) as
q(c;¢) = u(c) exp(¡¢);
and the Hamiltonian as
H = q(c;¢) + ¸ph(a; c) + ´p± (c) :
Suppose that (c¤; a¤;¢¤) satis…es the …rst-order condition and the transver-
sality condition of problem (P):Ã
@H
@ci
=
!
qci (c
¤;¢¤) + ¸phci (a
¤; c¤) + ´p±ci (c
¤) = 0; i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n;(A.1)
Ã
@H
@a
=
!
¸pha (a
¤; c¤) = ¡ _¸ p; (A.2)
Ã
@H
@¢
=
!
q¢ (c
¤;¢¤) = ¡ _´ p; (A.3)
lim
t!1 a
¤ (t)¸p (t) = 0; (A.4)
lim
t!1 ¢
¤ (t) ´p (t) = 0: (A.5)
Then, the following lemmas hold.
Lemma A.1: q is concave in (c;¢) if and only if (i) u < 0; (ii) u is concave,
and (iii) ¡u is log-convex.
Proof. Because qcicj = ucicj exp(¡¢), qci¢ = ¡uci exp(¡¢), q¢¢ = u exp(¡¢),
the necessary and su¢cient condition for the concavity of q (or the convexity
of ¡q) is that
X ´
0BBBB@
¡uc1c1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ucnc1 uc1
...
. . .
...
...
¡uc1cn ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ucncn ucn
uc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ucn ¡u
1CCCCA
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is a positive semi-de…nite matrix, i.e., any determinant of the principal sub-
matrix of X is non-negative:¯¯¯
Xfi1;¢¢¢;img
¯¯¯
¸ 0; for any fi1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; img satisfying 1 · i1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < im · n+ 1;
where Xfi1;¢¢¢;img denotes the principal submatrix of X which lies in rows
i1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; im and columns i1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; im
Ã
e.g., Xf1;n+1g =
Ã ¡uc1c1 uc1
uc1 ¡u
!!
. Then,
we can prove the following properties:
(a)
¯¯¯
Xfn+1g
¯¯¯
¸ 0 i¤ u < 0;
(b)
¯¯¯
Xfi1;¢¢¢;img
¯¯¯
¸ 0 for any fi1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; img satisfying 1 · i1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < im · n
i¤ u is concave; and
(c)
¯¯¯
Xfi1;¢¢¢;im;n+1g
¯¯¯
¸ 0 for any fi1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; img satisfying 1 · i1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < im ·
n i¤ ¡u is log-convex.
Since (a) and (b) are obvious, let us sketch the proof of (c). The necessary
and su¢cient condition for the log-convexity of ¡u is that
Z ´
0BB@
uuc1c1 ¡ uc1uc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ uucnc1 ¡ ucnuc1
...
. . .
...
uuc1cn ¡ uc1ucn ¢ ¢ ¢ uucncn ¡ ucnucn
1CCA
is a positive semi-de…nite matrix, i.e., any determinant of the principal sub-
matrix of Z is non-negative:¯¯¯
Zfi1;¢¢¢;img
¯¯¯
¸ 0; for any fi1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; img satisfying 1 · i1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < im · n:
Now, we can show that¯¯¯
Xfi1;¢¢¢;im;n+1g
¯¯¯
= (¡u)¡m+1
¯¯¯
Zfi1;¢¢¢;img
¯¯¯
:
For example,
¯¯¯
Xf1;¢¢¢;n;n+1g
¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
¡uc1c1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ucnc1 uc1
...
. . .
...
...
¡uc1cn ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ucncn ucn
uc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ucn ¡u
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
= (¡u)¡n
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
uuc1c1 ¢ ¢ ¢ uucnc1 uc1
...
. . .
...
...
uuc1cn ¢ ¢ ¢ uucncn ucn
¡uuc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡uucn ¡u
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
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= (¡u)¡n
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
uuc1c1 ¡ uc1uc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ uucnc1 ¡ ucnuc1 uc1
...
. . .
...
...
uuc1cn ¡ uc1ucn ¢ ¢ ¢ uucncn ¡ ucncn ucn
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0 ¡u
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
= (¡u)¡n+1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ uuc1c1 ¡ uc1uc1 ¢ ¢ ¢ uucnc1 ¡ ucnuc1... . . . ...
uuc1cn ¡ uc1ucn ¢ ¢ ¢ uucncn ¡ ucnucn
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
= (¡u)¡n+1
¯¯¯
Zf1;¢¢¢;ng
¯¯¯
:
Properties (a), (b), and (c) imply lemma A.1.
Therefore, Proposition 1 follows from Lemma A.2 below:
Lemma A.2: Suppose that the following conditions are met:
1. q is concave in (c;¢);
2. ± is concave in c; and
3. h is concave in (a; c).
Then, we have
D ´
Z 1
0
fq (c¤;¢¤)¡ q (c;¢)gdt ¸ 0
for any feasible paths (c; a;¢).
Proof. D satis…es
D =
Z 1
0
fq (c¤;¢¤)¡ q (c;¢)g dt
¸
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) qci (c¤;¢¤) + (¢¤ ¡¢) q¢ (c¤;¢¤)
)
dt (the concavity of q)
=
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (¡¸phci (a¤; c¤)¡ ´p±ci (c¤)) + (¢¤ ¡¢) (¡ _´ p)
)
dt
= I1 + I2;
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where I1 and I2 are:
I1 =
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (¡¸phci (a¤; c¤))
)
dt;
I2 =
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (¡´p±ci (c¤)) + (¢¤ ¡¢) (¡ _´ p)
)
dt:
I1 and I2 are both positive as I shall show now. I1 satis…es:
I1 =
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (¡¸phci (a¤; c¤)) + (a¤ ¡ a)
³
¡¸pha (a¤; c¤)¡ _¸ p
´)
dt
¸
Z 1
0
n
¡¸p (h (a¤; c¤)¡ h (a; c))¡ (a¤ ¡ a) _¸ p
o
dt (the concavity of h)
=
Z 1
0
n
¡ ( _a¤ ¡ _a)¸p ¡ (a¤ ¡ a) _¸ p
o
dt
= ¡ [(a¤ ¡ a)¸p]10
= lim
t!1 a (t)¸
p (t) (a¤ (0) = a (0) = a0)
¸ 0 (¸p (t) ¸ 0):
As for I2, we have:
I2 =
Z 1
0
(
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (¡´p±ci (c¤)) +
³
_¢¤ ¡ _¢
´
´p
)
dt¡ [(¢¤ ¡¢) ´p]10
=
Z 1
0
´p
(
± (c¤)¡ ± (c)¡
nX
i=1
(c¤i ¡ ci) (±ci (c¤))
)
dt¡ [(¢¤ ¡¢) ´p]10
¸ ¡ [(¢¤ ¡¢) ´p]10 (the concavity of ±)
= lim
t!1¢(t) ´
p (t)
¸ 0 (´p (t) ¸ 0 (See footnote 3 in the text.)).
This implies D ¸ 0:
B Proof of Property 1
By linearizing system (11) around the steady state, the local dynamic system
can be obtained as0B@ _c_Á
_k
1CA =
0B@ 0
±±c
gcc
¡gc(1¡¿)fkk
gcc
¡gc ± 0
¡1 0 fk
1CA
0B@ c^Á^
k^
1CA ;
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where the coe¢cient matrix is evaluated at the steady state. For this coe¢-
cient matrix,
trace = ± + fk > 0; det =
±gc
gcc
(±cfk ¡ (1¡ ¿ ) fkk) :
The linear system thus has two positive and one negative roots if and only
±cfk ¡ (1¡ ¿) fkk > 0, as stated in Property 1.
When ±cfk ¡ (1¡ ¿ ) fkk < 0; the determinant of the coe¢cient matrix is
positive, implying that (i) the three roots are all positive; or that (ii) two
roots are negative and the other one is positive.. It is easy to show that
case (ii) cannot occur insofar as the capital tax rate ¿ is su¢ciently small or
su¢ciently large, as in Remark 3. For example, when ±cfk ¡ (1¡ ¿ ) fkk < 0;
the three roots are all positive if
gcfkk
gcc
(±cfk ¡ (1¡ ¿) fkk) + ±fk ¡ ¿ gc
gcc
±cfk > 0:
This inequality indeed holds valid when ¿ = 0 or 1:
C Proof of Property 2
Noting that
Àc = ¡Âm
Âc
;
ÀÁ = ¡ r±uum
mgmmÂm
;
Àk = ¡fkk
Âm
¡ gm
mgmmÂm
fkk;
the local dynamic system can be obtained as0B@ _c_Á
_k
1CA = A
0B@ c^Á^
k^
1CA ;
A =
0BB@
0 r±uuc
gcc
¡ gc
gcc
fkk
¡gc ¡ gm(¡ÂmÂc ) r ¡ gm(¡ r±uummgmmÂm ) ¡gm(fkkÂm + gmmgmmÂmfkk)
¡1 0 r
1CCA ;
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where coe¢cient matrix A is evaluated at the steady state. Then, the linear
system has two positive and one negative roots only if
det (A) =
gm
gccÂm
r±uucfkk +
gcr
gcc
"
(1¡ gm
gc
Âc
Âm
)r±uuc ¡ fkk
#
< 0;
or alternatively stated, only if
¤ = (1¡ Â Âc
Âm
)r±uuc ¡ fkk + Â
Âm
±uucfkk > 0;
as in Property 2. Note also that if ¤ > 0 and if
(trace (A) =) 2r +
gmr±uum
mgmmÂm
> 0;
the system indeed has two positive and one negative roots, and is saddle-point
stable, as demonstrated in Remark 4.
D Proof of Property 3
By linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state, we obtain0BBBB@
_c1
_Á
1
_Á
2
_b
1CCCCA =
Ã
B O3£1
C r
!0BBBBB@
c^1
Á^
1
Á^
2
b^
1CCCCCA ;
B =
0BB@ 0 ¡
³
¾1¾2
¾1+¾2
´
r±1c
g1c
³
¾1¾2
¾1+¾2
´
r±2c
g2c¡g1c r 0
g2c 0 r
1CCA ;
where the coe¢cient matrix is evaluated at the steady state. The roots of
this linear system are thus r and three eigenvalues of B. Because trace(B) =
2r > 0, B has two positive and one negative eigenvalues when
det (B) = ¡r2 ¾
1¾2
¾1 + ¾2
³
±1c + ±
2
c
´
< 0:
Therefore, if ±1c+±
2
c > 0, the linear system has three positive and one negative
roots.
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Figure 1. Non-monotonic impatience 
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Figure 2. Capital taxation under decreasing impatience 
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Figure 3. Inflation and capital stock under decreasing impatience 
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Figure 5 (b). Multiple steady-state equilibria 
?2 
S1 
U 
S2 
?1 
?2 
Figure 5 (a).  Multiple steady-state equilibria   
 
   
 
 
S  
